GC 2020: The Two Thirds Majority – A follow up on the UMCNext Proposal and the Indy Plan

Frank Holbrook 2 GC 2020

While reviewing the UMCNext proposal (“Next Plan”), GC 2020: UMCNext’s Proposal – PlaneGrace’s Analysis,  I recently commented on the plan’s use of the two-third’s majority standard for determining whether a local church may opt out of the United Methodist Church. In that post I considered the practical effect of the two thirds majority:

The second indicator of the Next Plan being a hostile takeover bid, is the coupling of two provisions. First, the Next Plan adopts a default option that leaves a local church within the United Methodist Church. It couples its default option with the high bar of a two thirds majority for a local church to opt out of the denomination. The practical impact of coupling these two points should not be underestimated.

After further reflection on the point I believe my critique may have been too harsh. It is certainly likely that the proponents of the Next Plan believe the two thirds majority is required. This post analyzes the issue of whether there is a two thirds majority requirement for a local church’s vote on leaving the denomination or joining a new expression. The post concludes that there is no such requirement.

Preliminary Matters and Polity Considerations

In a discussion of the threshold for a local church vote, there are three separate questions:

(1) “Does the constitution mandate a vote threshold?” If it does, then the GC is powerless to modify the threshold unless it amends the constitution.

(2) If there is no constitutional mandate, which body has the power to set the threshold? Given the constitutional structure of the United Methodist Church, the question becomes: “Does the General Conference or annual conference have the power to set a voting threshold on an issue?”

(3) Finally, regardless of whether the annual conference or General Conference has the power to set the threshold: “What is the proper threshold?” This is a policy decision about which there can be differences of opinion.

In his recent post at Embody Grace, Rev. John Stephens observed the following concerning the two thirds threshold: “A 2/3 threshold is more in harmony with local churches being reassigned conferences (BOD, par 41). Judicial Council decision 1379 also made a broad statement that “any legislation of the General Conference permitting the ‘gracious exit’ of a local church must require at a minimum (1) the disaffiliation resolution be approved by a 2/3 majority of the professing members of the local church…” This quote touches on two of the points above. The first part of the statement concerning the threshold being in harmony, is a policy argument. The second statement regarding Judicial Decision 1379 goes to the issue of whether the two thirds requirement is lawfully required.

Is the Two Thirds Requirement Constitutionally Mandated?

The Judicial Council’s actions in JD 1366 and JD 1379 clearly establish that there is no constitutional requirement for a two thirds local vote on the issue of disaffiliation. In JD 1379 the Judicial Council established that ¶ 41 deals with the limited circumstance of a local church being transferred from one annual conference to a second annual conference. JD 1379 concluded that ¶41 does not control disaffiliation. In fact, it is beyond dispute that there is no constitutional provision that expressly addresses disaffiliation. This raises the related issue: “If there is no constitutional provision expressly addressing disaffiliation, does the General Conference have the constitutional authority to deal with the issue?”

In JD 1379 the Judicial Council stated: “However, under the principle of enumerated powers, ‘all matters distinctly connectional,’ over which the General Conference has full legislative power, must be expressly listed in the Constitution. Constitution, ¶ 16. Since the disaffiliation of local churches is not mentioned among the enumerated powers of the General Conference, this subject matter has “not been delegated to the General Conference under the Constitution,” and, therefore, the final decision concerning exiting local churches belongs to the annual conference as part of its “reserved rights.” Constitution, ¶ 33.”

This statement by the Judicial Council injects great uncertainty into the current debate over disaffiliation and creating new expressions. Taken literally, the General Conference, being a legislative body with limited enumerated powers, has no authority to address disaffiliation. Saying the subject matter has not been delegated to the General Conference means the body has no constitutional power to address disaffiliation at all. Therefore, taken on its face, JD 1379 means that disaffiliation would be a subject that could only be addressed by the Annual Conference. If the General Conference has no power over the subject matter, the logical conclusion is that each annual conference retains the complete power to address disaffiliation. Essentially, under this construction, disaffiliation would be an ad hoc process with each annual conference totally free to establish its own rules.

The Judicial Council seems to temper its statement by saying the annual conference has the “final decision” as part of its reserved rights. Respectfully, I would suggest that if the General Conference truly has no authority to address the subject matter of disaffiliation, the Annual Conference not only has the final authority, it has complete authority. Of course, if the Judicial Council’s statement is true, then everything else it says about actions taken by the General Conference concerting disaffiliation would be dicta. The opinion in JD 1379 could have been very short and read something similar to the following: “Finding that the subject matter of disaffiliation has not been delegated to the General Conference under the Constitution, all actions taken by the General Conference regarding disaffiliation are null and void.” However, the Judicial Council did not do this. This suggests that the Judicial Council concluded that the General Conference indeed has some source of power to address disaffiliation.

Judicial Decision 1379 must be read as concluding that disaffiliation falls within the subject matter of is part of the General Conference’s powers under ¶16: “The General Conference shall have full legislative power over all matters distinctively connectional, and in the exercise of this power shall have authority as follows: . . . 8.  To initiate and to direct all connectional enterprises of the Church and to provide boards for their promotion and administration.”

In fact, further reading of JD 1379 finds support for the conclusion that disaffiliation falls within the full legislative power of the General Conference as to all matters distinctly connectional. The Judicial Council pointed to ¶2529 as support for its holding: “Fortunately, there is a provision elsewhere in The Discipline, which supplies the missing requirement. Paragraph 2529, placed under “Section VI. Local Church Property” and entitled “Charge Conference Authority,” which provides, in § 1(b)(3): b) Regardless of whether the charge conference elects to incorporate the local church, the local church: (3) cannot sever its connectional relationship to The United Methodist Church without the consent of the annual conference.” One can only ask, if the General Conference has no power over disaffiliation, how can ¶2529 be anything but void? Paragraph 2529 is a provision, enacted by the General Conference, addressing disaffiliation (“sever connectional relationship”). If the General Conference had no right to address the subject matter of disaffiliation, then ¶2529 could not have been relied upon by the Judicial Council to supply the “missing requirement”.

Why is any of this important? There are two main reasons. First, either the General Conference has the power to address disaffiliation or it doesn’t. There would appear to be no middle ground where the General Conference “sort of” has the power. Despite the broad generalization appearing in the decision, in my opinion, the better reading of JD 1379 is a judicial recognition, that (a) General Conference has the power to address disaffiliation but (B) the final vote is a decision reserved by the constitution to the annual Conference. This conclusion seems to be the only way to harmonize the action taken by the Judicial Council.

Second, if the General Conference has power over disaffiliation it would also seem to have subject matter power over affiliation with new expressions as a connectional matter. Connectionalism is implicated in both the decision of an annual conference or local church to join a new expression and in the circumstances where a decision is made to enter into full communion with a new expression (assuming that is part of a plan). Certainly it appears that the General Conference is constitutionally empowered to make these decisions. If JD 1379 really stands for the proposition that the General Conference has no power in these matters, then a declaratory decision should be sought so that the General Conference doesn’t waste time considering disaffiliation or creation new expressions. However, if the General Conference cannot address these issues then the United Methodist Church will eventually die a slow death due to being locked into a structure which the General Conference can’t modify and from which no local church can leave. In the words of Hotel California: “You can check out anytime you want, but you can never leave.”

Judicial Decision 1379 includes the broad observation that “Any legislation of the General Conference permitting the “gracious exit” of a local church must have the following minimum requirements: (1) Approval of the disaffiliation resolution by a two-thirds majority of the professing members of the local church present and voting at the church conference.” The question becomes: “what is the source for the Judicial Council’s mandate of a two thirds majority threshold?”

Clearly, the Judicial Council couldn’t have relied on ¶41 of the Constitution to support this conclusion. The decision concedes that the paragraph does not apply to disaffiliation and is limited to those circumstances where a local church is transferring between annual conferences. I have reviewed the Constitution and find only two situations where a two thirds vote is constitutionally mandated. First, a two thirds majority is required where the General Conference is addressing the scope of a called special session (¶15 “The purpose of such special session shall be stated in the call, and only such business shall be transacted as is in harmony with the purpose stated in such call unless the General Conference by a two-thirds vote shall determine that other business may be transacted.) Second, a two thirds majority is required to amend the constitution (¶¶ 59 and 61). If there is no constitutional requirement, what is the source of the two thirds threshold requirement in JD 1379?

Apparently, the Judicial Council was relying on ¶260 and the terms of the ¶2553. Paragraph 260 is clearly enabling legislation that deals with implementing the constitutional provision found at ¶41. Paragraph 260 is required by ¶41 to include a two thirds majority. The constitution mandated the voting threshold; the General Conference had no power to alter the constitutionally mandated vote requirement. Paragraph 2553 incorporated the procedure set forth in ¶248 and adopted the two thirds requirements as part of the proposed legislation. Thus, in ¶2553 the General Conference made the policy decision to include a two thirds voting threshold as part of the legislation; however, since ¶41 did not govern disaffiliation there was no constitutional mandate for this requirement.

If the constitution does not require a two thirds majority, what is the source of JD 1379’s “requirement” for all future legislation addressing disaffiliation or joining a new expression to include it? Respectfully, I suggest that there should be no such threshold requirement as to future legislation. To assume that is the case would be to assume that the requirement was fashioned out of whole cloth by the judicial council and imposed by judicial fiat. I believe the Judicial Council has no history of “legislating from the bench” and I do not believe that occurred in JD 1379. To give the decision a broad literal reading and allow the decision to impose the requirement is to implicitly grant the Judicial Council extremely broad legislative powers that it does not possess and has not claimed.

I admit that my analysis may be incorrect or I may have overlooked some provision. In making these comments I intend no disrespect to the Judicial Council.  I invite a response that would correct the analysis if it is in error.  This is a point that may need more virtual Holy Conferencing.

Does the General Conference or annual conference have the power to set a voting threshold on an issue?

If the General Conference has the power to deal with the subject matter of disaffiliation and joining new expressions, is that power limited when it sets voting requirements? In other words, who gets to set the voting threshold, the General Conference or the annual conference? I believe that the General Conference has that power for numerous reasons, including the following three.

First is the concept of legality. If annual conferences are allowed to set voting thresholds, then different local churches may be subject to different outcomes depending solely upon their geographic location. Judicial Decision 1366 included the following observations regarding legality: “As a tenet of United Methodist constitutionalism, the principle of legality means that all individuals and entities are equally bound by Church law, which shall be applied fairly and without regard to race, color, national origin, status, or economic condition. It forbids selective or partial enforcement of Church law at all levels of the connection and demands that The Discipline in its entirety be followed without distinction.” Arguably, allowing annual conferences to set different voting thresholds would violate the concept of legality.

Second, is the possibility of arbitrary action. If an annual conference may set voting thresholds, may it require a unanimous vote? If not, why not? What is the limiting principle? Fairness, reasonableness or some other subjective standard? I believe most people would agree that a unanimous voting requirement would be unconscionable. Similarly, 1% vote to disaffiliate would be ridiculous. Why? Because it offends the idea that a majority should decide. But if annual conferences have the unfettered right to set voting requirements couldn’t they set a unanimous or 1% threshold? Could an annual conference allow sliding voting requirements depending on church size, population density in the surrounding area or geographic location? Once the decision regarding voting thresholds is delegated to the annual conferences, the potential for inconsistent and arbitrary results is present.

Third, history demonstrates that the General Conference has the power to impose voting requirements even where a subject matter is retained by the annual conference. For example, Paragraph 33 of the Constitution provides, in part, as follows: “The annual conference is the basic body in the Church and as such shall have reserved to it the right to vote . . . on all matters relating to the character and conference relations of its clergy members, and on the ordination of clergy . . .”. If a constitutionally enumerated power means that an annual conference also has the power to set voting thresholds then the BOD is replete with unconstitutional General Conference actions in the areas of character of clergy and ordination . For example, if the constitutional power to vote on all matters related to the ordination of clergy means that the annual conference has the power to set voting thresholds then Paragraphs 310, 315, 319, 322, 324 of the BOD, requiring a three-fourths majority vote during the ordination process would appear to be void. Clearly, the General Conference has the power, and the duty, to establish voting thresholds.

What is the Proper Policy Decision on a Voting Threshold?

The proper voting threshold is a policy decision that must be made by the proper legislative body. In the context of the local church vote I believe Rev. Stephens provides an insightful outline of some of the competing concerns that enter into the policy considerations. I have taken the liberty of including a lengthy quote from his blog that addresses many of the policy considerations:

If General Conference allows for annual conferences to leave and join a new denomination of Methodism, they should also allow remedy for local churches that disagree with the annual conference’s decision. If an annual conference is allowed to leave, a church within the annual conference may choose to go with them (no vote required) or choose a different expression – remain in UMC or go with one of the new, birthed expressions (a vote is required here, or some active decision).
How that decision is made in a local church would need to be clearly defined. What would the threshold be?

Like the annual conference threshold, this is an important determination. A local church may leave an annual conference now. A local church may also change annual conferences in certain circumstances. Currently, the annual conference determines the basis for a local church to ‘disaffiliate’ since the annual conference owns the property of the church and the unfunded pension liability.

Currently, the Indy Plan allows any local church that disagrees with the decision of their annual conference to align with another expression. Only a simple majority – 50%+1, would be needed.

While this does sound fair and equitable, we return to the question of appropriate thresholds when property and membership are at stake. I don’t know the local church votes totals of the recently disaffiliated congregations in the Mississippi Conference, but earlier instances of churches leaving had the votes at well over 90-95% in favor of leaving. I led a church merger in the early 2000’s, led an adoption merger in 2017, and am in discussions with another church regarding adoption merger. These decisions can be deeply painful for many. The first merger I led, we used a simple majority threshold. It passed 55%-45% and caused more pain than I could have ever imagined. Families were split in two. Friendships were broken. I promised myself we would always use a super-majority in the future. In 2017, we used a 2/3 threshold for an adoption merger in Houston. The process took longer, but they voted to merge with Chapelwood at an 80% threshold. What if a church votes 60% and cannot leave? I realize this works both ways – see my thoughts on this below. With annual conferences, my rationale is rooted in organizational integrity (2/3 is current threshold for overseas annual conferences to disaffiliate and become autonomous churches).

A 2/3 threshold is more in harmony with local churches being reassigned conferences (BOD, par 41). Judicial Council decision 1379 also made a broad statement that “any legislation of the General Conference permitting the ‘gracious exit’ of a local church must require at a minimum (1) the disaffiliation resolution be approved by a 2/3 majority of the professing members of the local church…”

While it may not seem ‘fair’ to some, it may be difficult to pass and secure anything less than a 2/3 majority for local churches to depart.

On a personal note; I advocate for the simplest solutions possible, but I am not sure how to simplify this. There will be churches where the church votes 53%-47% to remain in the UMC/centrist/progressive expression, what happens to the 47% who desire a traditionalist church? They will have to make a decision to remain in their church or depart. It breaks my heart.

A super majority vote threshold has traditionally been the threshold to change categories of membership (expel), suspend rules, change fundamental rules (constitutional and restrictive), etc. This is reflected in our Book of Discipline and Judicial Council decisions.

I continue to encourage readers to review his posts concerning the Indianapolis Plan. His blog may be found here.  I find his commentary to be thought provoking and the type of dialogue that is necessary as we approach GC 2020. The threshold voting requirement sounds like an easy piece of any puzzle; however, Rev. Stephens’ blog demonstrates the nuanced complexity of the issue.

A final observation on voting thresholds. In my opinion, if GC 2020 decides to adopt (1) a plan allowing for new expressions and (2) additional legislation allowing for straight disaffiliation then the General Conference would be perfectly justified to impose two different voting thresholds for local churches pursuing these two different paths. It appears to be a worthy goal to encourage local churches to maintain connection with other Wesleyan new expressions and a lower voting threshold might be appropriate in those circumstances. On the other hand, those local churches that opt for a quick exit from the denomination without maintaining connection might be required to meet a higher threshold for a straight exit. This appears to be one of the areas where Gracious Affiliation might have more favorable terms and conditions than a straight exit.

Conclusion

In my opinion those who are operating under the assumption that a two thirds super-majority is required for local church votes on disaffiliation or joining a new expression are mistaken; however, I understand why one could reach that conclusion. Frankly, my analysis may be wrong; but like all people who have an opinion on an issue I think I’m right. I think I’m right but I’m not 100% convinced.  Candidly, I invite someone to provide an analysis that proves me wrong. I’m open to that possibility.

On the other hand, those who argue that the General Conference should impose a two thirds majority voting threshold as a policy matter are not in error in holding that position as a matter of principle. Concluding that the General Conference has the power to adopt a lower threshold is not the same as concluding it should be done. But arguing that it must be done because it is constitutionally required is not, in my opinion, a correct position.

Establishing one or more voting thresholds is a critical piece of the upcoming legislative process. The issue deserves clear thinking concerning the powers of General Conference. If possible, clear direction from the Judicial Council concerning the allocation of the powers of the General Conference and annual conferences would enable the General Conference to operate with knowledge of the  proper boundaries of its lawful actions.  JD 1379 does not provide that clear guidance.